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SWISS MONETARY POLICY IN THE 
NEW WORLD OF THE EURO: THE 
SWISS MUST BANK ON THEIR 
SENSE TO SURVIVE 
David Lawrence Thorn 
Introduction 
In a speech given in October 1999 at the 
Swiss-American Chamber of Commerce in 
New York, Hans Meyer, Chairman of the 
Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, 
commented, "It is perhaps a small comfort, 
but nevertheless important, to point out that 
we find ourselves in a similar position as our 
neighbors and other comparable industrial 
states." (Meyer, "A View ... ," p. 3) This remark 
alludes to Switzerland's peculiar geographical, 
political, and financial situation, the fact that 
it lies at the very heart of a monetarily unified 
Europe and, although Switzerland is not a 
member itself, shares its borders with four of 
the eleven member countries that currently 
comprise the European Monetary Union. A 
consequence of this triplex similarity to its 
neighbors is that Switzerland has been forced 
into a new economic environment to which 
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adaptation is a necessity for the future viabil-
ity of its independence. In this setting Swiss 
monetary policy decisions must be made with 
critical consideration given to the policies of 
the European Central Bank and to the gener-
al condition of the euro economy. Indeed, for 
the past several years the Swiss have been 
ardently working to bring certain policies 
more in line with EU policy. Currently, the 
Swiss have assumed a somewhat liberal yet 
perpetually vigilant monetary policy stance 
and are prepared to take reactive measures in 
the event of any economic turbulence from 
either within or outside of their borders. 
This article will examine both the mon-
etary policies of the Swiss National Bank 
(SNB) and the European Central Bank (ECB). 
After a thorough comparison of policy goals, 
instrumentation, and implementation, the 
central focus will be to highlight specific 
instances in which the Swiss have been com-
pelled to conform to the long-term monetary 
policy stance of the European Central Bank. 
Past experience, present know-how, and the 
future prospects of successful and respectable 
independent survival will prove to be the guid-
ing forces behind Switzerland's voluntary 
exclusion from one of the largest economic 
entities in the world. 
Past Experience 
There currently exists an intricate inter-
relationship between the economies of 
Switzerland and the European Union that is 
fundamentally based on a history of profuse 
trade between the Swiss and the individual 
countries of the EU. This arrangement was 
initiated following the Bretton Woods 
Conference in 1944 with the liberalization of 
international commerce throughout the 
world. Deregulation in many domestic finan-
cial markets was a necessary precursor of the 
existence of free trade. Of singular impor-
tance to Switzerland and its role as one of the 
preeminent financial centers in the world was 
the eventual dismantling of the barriers 
against exchangeable capital. Once the notion 
of convertible currencies gained acceptance, 
flexible exchange rates became a reality; sub-
sequently goods, services, and capital were 
finally able to flow freely across borders. 
(Gehrig, p. 2) In addition to these relaxed 
international constraints, the overwhelming 
growth of information technology has also 
had an enormous impact on international 
capital markets. ("Recent Trends in 
Euroland ... ") Undoubtedly, economic and 
technological globalization are rapidly reshap-
ing the modern world. 
As a result of these transitions, the 
aggregate level of trade between continental 
European countries today is astounding. Due 
to their geographical proximity, individual 
countries of Western Europe are able to main-
tain multiple trading partners at little or no 
cost. In 1996 exports of goods and services 
accounted for nearly half of Swiss real GOP 
even though it was the last year of a prolonged 
cyclical economic stagnation in Switzerland. 
An astonishing 62 percent of merchandise 
exports were sold to EU member countries 
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alone. Currently two-thirds of Swiss goods 
are destined for the European Union while 75 
percent of Swiss imports are derived from it. 
Furthermore, Switzerland has become the 
second largest trading partner of the 
European Union. Only the United States and 
Japan supply more goods and services to the 
EU, and only the United States imports more 
than the Swiss. ("Switzerland's Relations ... ") 
EU members Germany, France, and 
Italy, all of whom share borders with 
Switzerland, are the main recipients of Swiss 
goods. (Merrill Lynch, p. 2) It is an undeni-
able fact that because of these geographic and 
historical ties, because Switzerland is such an 
integral component of both the European 
trade market and its associated commercial 
trade routes over and beneath the impeding 
Alps, and also because of the current global 
economic and technological consolidation, a 
stable external value of the Swiss franc rela-
tive to the euro is essential for a healthy, func-
tional Swiss economy. (Merrill Lynch, p. 2) 
Monetary policy provides the primary 
means by which the Swiss can leverage any 
control over the appreciation or depreciation 
of their currency. If that control is lost, as in 
the case from August 1992 to September 1995 
when the Swiss franc appreciated 28 percent 
against the currencies of Switzerland's major 
trading partners, the entire Swiss economy 
suffers. (Merrill Lynch, p. 2) The adverse 
effects of this specific overvaluation con-
tributed largely to a six-year stint of econom-
ic stagnation in Switzerland. In 1997, how-
ever, an export-led recovery was launched at 
the hands of a real effective depreciation of 
the Swiss franc and a proliferation in demand 
from neighboring European countries. A shift 
to an expansionary monetary policy was large-
ly responsible for initiating the recovery. 
("IMF Concludes ... ," p. 1) 
Historically, appreciation pressures on 
the Swiss franc have been tied to the invest-
ment community's conception of Switzerland 
as a "safe haven." (Organization for 
Economic ... ," p. 38) A more extreme yet sim-
ilar case of overvaluation occurred during the 
fall months of 1977 when international 
demand for the Swiss franc grew to such pro-
portions that the Swiss National Bank was 
compelled to provide negative interest rates 
on Swiss franc deposits owned by foreigners. 
(Gehrig, p. 4) In both cases of appreciation, 
however, external circumstances in the 
European Community - specifically, an 
unstable exchange rate triggered by high 
external inflation- was the antecedent to the 
Swiss franc overvaluation. 
These historical fluctuations represent the 
primary concern for contemporary policymak-
ers. Uncertainties over the inception and pur-
suing infancy of the euro could bring about a 
capital flight from investments within the 
European Union to assets controlled by other 
hard currencies like the Swiss franc. An appre-
ciation of the Swiss franc real exchange rate 
would follow, affecting both domestic output 
and employment in Switzerland. (Laxton and 
Prasad, p. 3) However, the possibility of such a 
preference shift in the direction of Swiss franc-
denominated assets is speculative; furthermore, 
the effects of any such capital shift on the 
exchange rate and the Swiss economy are not 
entirely ungovernable. (Laxton and Prasad, 
p. 4) Through their monetary policy decisions, 
Swiss policymakers have the capability of 
adjusting their relevant monetary instruments 
in accordance with the present state of both 
internal and external economic conditions, the 
capital goal being price stability. 
Present Know-How: The SNB and 
the ECB 
As of the turn of the millennium 
Switzerland faces a drastically different mon~ 
etary situation. There are no longer multiple 
neighbors against which to gauge its mone-
tary policies. Rather, Switzerland has become 
utterly engulfed by the single economic enti-
ty of "Euroland." (Gehrig, p. 2) The relation-
ship between the EU and the smaller Swiss 
Confederation can be likened to that of a sus-
ceptible David and a volatile Goliath. 
Switzerland must bank on its sense to survive. 
It cannot assume a monetary policy stance 
opposed to that of the European Central Bank 
or it would be crushed beneath the weight of 
the ever-increasing and unpredictable 
European Union. The following comparison 
between the monetary policies of both parties 
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will highlight their similarities, differences, 
and most significantly, the emerging depen-
dency of David on Goliath. 
Swiss Monetary Policy 
Price stability in the medium term is the 
primary goal of the Swiss National Bank, and it 
strives to achieve this by making full use of 
Switzerland's production capacity. Stable prices 
are mandatory for a functional and successful 
economy. An unanticipated expansion of the 
money supply would result in demand increas-
es for goods and services, which would lead to 
higher prices. An insufficient supply of money 
would have the reverse effects of hindering pro-
duction and lowering the price level. 
("Principles ... ," p. 1) The SNB also aims to 
smooth cyclical fluctuations in economic activ-
ity by adjusting interest rates in accordance 
with economic capacity. Additionally, with 
regard to the uncertainties of EU success, the 
Swiss National Bank is prepared at every 
moment to react to severe shifts in the 
exchange rate and the demand for money. 
("Principles ... ," p. 1) 
When it appears that a certain economic 
indicator has a relatively stable relation to the 
goal of price stability, the SNB will utilize that 
indicator as an intermediate monetary policy 
target. Historically, Switzerland has used the 
monetary base (M1) as its primary monetary 
indicator. ("Principles ... ," p. 1) However, by the 
end of 1998, the level of the monetary base was 
up 4.4 percent from the previous year, greatly 
exceeding its medium-term target path. ("IMF 
Concludes ... ," p. 4) Therefore, in 1998 the SNB 
decided that M1 was no longer a dependable 
indicator because fluctuations in banknote cir-
culation and sight deposits, the two components 
of the monetary base, were deemed unpre-
dictable. ("Principles ... ," p. 1) Consequently, 
Directors of the IMF Executive Board urged the 
Swiss National Bank to explain its policy deci-
sions as clearly as possible and to monitor trends 
in more reliable monetary aggregates including 
the exchange rate, the cyclical position of the 
Swiss economy, and, above all, M3. ("IMF 
Concludes ... ," p. 3) 
The SNB is in agreement with these indi-
cators as additional means by which to control 
inflation in the short term. However, it con-
siders M3, which includes banknote circulation, 
sight and other transaction deposits of the non-
bank public, plus savings and time deposits, to 
be the most reliable indicator for targeting 
within the medium and long term. In fact, the 
monetary policy decision-makers at the SNB 
have become particularly fond of this broad 
monetary indicator, the most inclusive mone-
tary aggregate tallied by the National Bank, 
because of its long-term relationship to the 
price level. ("Principles ... ," p. 2) 
In summary, the SNB believes that accu-
rately interpreting the monetary base (M1) is 
no longer feasible due to the unpredictable 
nature of sight deposits in the arena of inter-
national financial instability. ("Monetary Policy 
Plans ... ," pp. 1-2) Additionally, the SNB cites 
as its reasoning this general but functional rule: 
An expansion in M3 is followed three years 
afterward by an increase in inflation. 
("Principles ... ," p. 2) In essence, if inflation is 
measured by a more stable indicator and over 
a longer period of time, the rate of inflation will 
fluctuate less. It is not surprising, however, that 
Switzerland's only neighbor, the European 
Union, also favors a relatively broad monetary 
aggregate, M3 to be specific, as its primary indi-
cator. ("Challenges for the Monetary ... ," p. 5) 
Implementing Swiss Monetary 
Policy 
The supply of Swiss francs, and hence 
money market rates and liquidity, is regulated 
by the SNB through financial transactions with 
Swiss commercial banks. Specifically, the com-
mercial banks place sight deposits, which are 
daily deposits serving as required reserves, with 
the SNB. Adjusting the supply of these deposits 
allows the SNB to tailor interest rates accord-
ing to its desired monetary policy. Interest rate 
adjustments eventually affect both banknote 
circulation and the less liquid monetary aggre-
gates. However, the magnitude of the required 
sight deposits is relatively small in comparison 
to the general daily movement of Swiss francs 
in the open economy. As a supplement to the 
desired supply of liquidity, the SNB chooses to 
operate in the call money market by purchas-
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ing assets and simultaneously selling them for-
ward, a process otherwise known as a repur-
chase agreement or a repo transaction. This 
arrangement is achieved when one participant 
sells his or her securities for cash and agrees to 
repurchase them in the future, but the essence 
of a repo transaction is more like a secured loan 
in which the securities serve as collateral. 
("Principles ... ," p. 2) This monetary policy was 
only recently implemented in April1998; and 
over the latter course of that year, repurchase 
agreements became the most exercised mone-
tary instrument of the SNB, outstripping the 
former favorite monetary policy-controlling 
device of foreign exchange swaps, which also 
consist of a spot transaction and a forward 
transaction. A liquidity swap provides a simple 
example of a foreign exchange swap. The SNB 
purchases foreign exchange against Swiss 
francs from commercial banks for a short peri-
od of time. At the end of that period, the trans-
action is reversed at a rate agreed upon at the 
initiation of the contract. ("The Central 
Bank's ... ," p. 1) Such swaps employ time hori-
zons between one and twelve months. 
("Principles ... ," p. 2) Conversely, repurchase 
agreements can be employed in both short- and 
long-term decisions with the foremost objec-
tive of conducting liquidity. This type of trans-
action is considered less risky than foreign 
exchange swaps because the salable securities 
must meet certain liquidity requirements. 
("The Central Bank's ... ," p. 1) Bruno Gehrig, 
member of the Governing Board of the SNB, 
also notes the quantitative advantages of repo 
transactions: "Instead of just three or four, we 
now deal with some twenty partners. Starting 
this summer [1999], our range of counterpar-
ties will include banks abroad, which underlines 
our willingness to operate as broadly as possi-
ble." (p. 5) Nonetheless, foreign exchange 
swaps against the euro are still implemented as 
one of the National Bank's three primary mon-
etary operations, as are advances against secu-
rities. ("The Central Bank's ... ," p. 1) It is not 
impractical, however, to assume that a highly 
successful and stable euro would eventually 
return foreign exchange swaps to the current 
inconstant and transitory spotlight of Swiss 
monetary policy instrumentation. 
Swiss Monetary Plans for the 
Future 
In detailing its monetary policy plans for 
1999, the Governing Board of the Swiss 
National Bank declared its intention to main-
tain a liberal policy in order to prolong 
Switzerland's maturing economic recovery. 
Concerns over the kickoff of the euro were 
resolved with the pledge: "The best contribu-
tion monetary policy can make is to guaran-
tee price stability," ("Monetary Policy 
Plans ... ," p. 1) which, in the opinion of the 
SNB, could be accomplished with an annual 
inflation rate of 1-2 percent. 
Ironically, the Swiss have also defined 
price stability as a social issue since, in their 
opinion, weaker members of the community 
are the most severely affected by inflation. 
("Monetary Policy Plans ... ," p. 1) The irony 
of this statement lies in the vague reference 
to "members of the community," which could 
be understood as either citizens within 
Switzerland or Switzerland itself within the 
broader context of the European Economic 
Community. In any case, the governing board 
of the SNB guaranteed that it would pursue a 
monetary policy similar to that of the 
European Central Bank in regard to both 
goals and operational framework. ("Monetary 
Policy Plans ... ," p. 1) The aim of SNB is to 
preserve exchange rate stability and, at the 
same time, to prevent the weaker members of 
the community, Switzerland in particular, 
from any inflationary suffering. 
As of December 1998, the Swiss had 
expected an optimistic 1.5 percent expansion 
of real gross domestic product for 1999. 
There were bleak hopes for the export sector 
due to external expectations of weak economic 
growth throughout continental Europe. 
However, domestic demand in Switzerland 
should continue to strengthen the economy. 
("Monetary Policy Plans ... ," p. 1) Prospects 
for a persistently low rate of inflation and an 
adequate exchange rate abounded. With 
regard to the introduction of the euro, the 
National Bank expressed its appetence for a 
smooth transition, yet remained poised to off-
set the effects of an increased demand for 
Swiss francs in the event of any external eco-
nomic turbulence - specifically, that which 
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could arise from the monetary policy deci-
sions of the European Central Bank. 
("Monetary Policy Plans ... ," pp. 1-2) 
The Development of the European 
Central Bank 
The Treaty on European Union, also known 
as the Maastricht Treaty, was signed in 1992. 
The primary objective of the Union was the 
establishment of the European Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) in which all member 
states would eventually share a common cur-
rency called the euro. Sound monetary and fis-
cal positions were required of all countries to be 
included in the monetary union. By midyear of 
1998, eleven of the fifteen countries that initially 
signed the treaty had satisfied the rigorous 
membership qualifications. ("Challenges ... ," 
p. 1) Meanwhile, the European Monetary 
Institute had begun framing the guidelines for 
the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) 
to be headed by the independent European 
Central Bank (ECB). Today, the underlying 
objective of the ECB is to maintain price stabil-
ity through the regulation of monetary policy 
for the entire euro-fied Union, while almost all 
fiscal responsibilities are to be retained by each 
member's central bank. ("Challenges ... ," p. 2) 
However, Article 7 of the ESCB Statute of the 
Maastricht Treaty guarantees a considerable 
degree of monetary policy independence for 
each respective country. Therefore, technically 
the ECB is left responsible for the "definition 
and pursuit of intermediate targets," M3 for 
example. ("Challenges ... ," p. 2) 
On January 1, 1999, the euro was offi-
cially launched as the single currency of the 
eleven participating countries. Indeed, this 
event will be recorded in the annals of histo-
ry as one of Europe's most challenging 
endeavors. The introduction of the euro 
required the most considerable relinquish-
ment of sovereignty by members of the EU 
thus far. Moreover, every facet of European 
society was affected by the implications of the 
new currency, as were the economies of the 
European Union's major trading partners, 
among them, Switzerland. (Barbarinde, p.1) 
Amid the tumult of the Kosovo crisis, its 
aftermath, and the Asian crisis, the inception 
of the euro was more successful than most 
analysts had predicted. However, various 
economists have noted a number of difficul-
ties in ascertaining the ECB's monetary poli-
cy plans. Many criticize the lack of trans-
parency, or policy privacy, in the European 
Central Bank's strategy, while others cite the 
Bundesbank of Germany and the Federal 
Reserve Board of the United States as two 
exemplary central banks that have succeeded 
somewhat in secrecy. (Mayer, "The ECB's ... ," 
p. S.07) Nevertheless, with examples of poli-
cy implementations from 1999, it is possible 
to piece together the opaque monetary policy 
framework of the ECB. 
ECB Monetary Policy 
The ECB faces contemporary challenges 
that other successful central banks have 
already overcome. Simply put, the ECB has 
no track record against which to gauge its 
performance. The effect of this, coupled with 
the magnitude of unification itself, has ush-
ered in a potentially debilitating sense of risk 
associated with European financial markets 
and economies. Considering these uncer-
tainties, the ECB maintains that in the end 
"money matters," and therefore has decided 
to pursue a long-term approach to price sta-
bility. It plans to accomplish this by analyz-
ing risks to price stability, utilizing a broad 
set of indicators, and by targeting a reference 
value for the growth of M3. (Mayer, "The 
ECB's ... ," p. S.06) Clearly the decision mak-
ers at the ECB have acknowledged the sever-
al potential short-term implications of risk or, 
in this case, expected uncertainties; conse-
quently, long-term stability is at the forefront 
of policy deliberation. 
The ECB has openly defined the general 
framework of its policy plans, which consists 
of three primary objectives. The first objec-
tive, common to all monetary policy strate-
gies, is a low rate of inflation. By the stan-
dards of the Harmonized Index of Consumer 
Prices (HICP), the European index for infla-
tion, the ECB strives for an annual inflation 
increase of below two percent. The second 
objective is the utilization of a broad quanti-
tative reference for the money supply. Finally, 
applying M3 as this broad monetary indicator, 
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the ECB states that it, too, has assumed a vig-
ilant stance with regard to price develop-
ments, considering specifically the potential 
risks associated with price stability in the euro 
area. ("Challenges ... ," p. 5) 
The specifics of this strategy are not well 
defined. However, the ECB does not adjust 
interest rates in order to maintain its infla-
tion objective, unlike the Bank of England, 
which adjusts its interest rates in response to 
deviations from the money growth target. 
Rather, the ECB believes that the euro must 
develop over an extended time horizon and 
that direct manipulation of policy tools in 
order to affect money growth should be 
shunned. (Mayer, "The ECB's ... ," p. S.06) 
The non-transparency of its monetary pol-
icy strategy poses various challenges to 
investors in the European Union, its trade part-
ners, and those of its neighbors who may be 
affected by its actions. Fortunately for the EU, 
because it has included or plans to include most 
of the European countries in its alliance, rela-
tively few neighbors are left to be affected by 
decisions that are not their own. Unfortunately 
for Switzerland, because it is landlocked by EU 
countries and because it is not an EU member, 
the effects of the ECB's monetary policy flow 
through Switzerland as does the Rhine. So how 
do the Swiss protect their economy from a flood 
of francs that poses far greater devastation than 
the spring flooding of the Rhine River after a 
winter of the heaviest recorded snowfall accu-
mulation in history? 
The SNB Conforms to the ECB 
Within the past two years, the Swiss 
National Bank has implemented a multitude of 
monetary policy changes in reaction to the 
European Central Bank's lack of transparency 
or clarity as well as its willingness to let the 
euro establish itself without severe monetary 
pressures. Because the euro has no track 
record, the ECB has elected to focus more 
aggressively on the medium and long term and 
is opposed to such short-term measures as the 
German and Swiss practice of inflationary tar-
geting. This decision is founded upon the 
notion that the ECB must gain credibility in 
order to attract investors who are risk-averse. 
Therefore, the ECB should take no risks with 
price stability in the short term because any 
deviation during that time would surely make 
it more difficult to achieve credibility in the 
long term. (Mayer, "EMU after ... ," p. 9) 
Consequently, the behemoth European 
Union has relaxed its attention on the short 
term; and Switzerland, being susceptible to the 
implications of the monetary policy decisions 
inflation and therefore exchange rates are less 
likely to fluctuate dramatically between the two 
currencies. The following graph, which plots 
the change in percent of the Swiss monetary 
aggregates over the last four years, illustrates 
Switzerland's motive. Note the stability of M3 
compared with M1, the former leading mone-
tary aggregate on which the Swiss had set tar-
gets in order to predict and manage inflation. 
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of its only neighbor, has followed accordingly. 
In detailing the practices of both the ECB and 
the SNB, several apparent instances of mone-
tary policy conformity by the Swiss are evident. 
Foremost is the Swiss National Bank's 1998 
decision to monitor M3, the broadest of all 
monetary aggregates, as its primary indicator. 
The ECB utilizes M3 because it more adequately 
supplies information relative to the long term. 
Had the Swiss not adopted this new aggregate, 
exchange rate fluctuations would hinder future 
trade with countries of the European Union. 
With both the ECB and the SNB following M3, 
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The second step taken by the Swiss 
National Bank on the heels of the ECB is less 
obvious than the adoption of M3. In April1998 
the Swiss abandoned their primary monetary 
implementation tool of foreign exchange swaps 
and adopted repo transactions in its place. The 
SNB had formerly conducted exchange swaps 
against the dollar until 1997, against the D-
mark of Germany through 1998, and against 
the euro since 1999. ("The Central Bank's .. . ," 
p. 1) Throughout these years, however, the 
global economy suffered from a far-reaching 
stagnation as a result of the Asian crisis. 
Perhaps the variability of its exchange swap 
partners over the last three years reveals the 
extent of the SNB's risk aversion. More likely, 
because repo transactions can be tailored for 
both the short- and long-term steering of liq-
uidity, whereas foreign exchange swaps gener-
ally operate within a short time horizon, the 
Swiss have conveniently advanced yet another 
step in the direction of ECB long-term confor-
mity. ("The Central Bank's ... ," p. 1) 
Furthermore, in the December 4, 1999, 
quarterly bulletin of the Swiss National Bank, 
the Board of Governors announced that it will 
no longer practice money supply targeting, 
which had hitherto comprised the SNB's pri-
mary monetary policy. ("Quarterly ... ") The 
stage for this conversion was set upon the 
adoption of M3 in 1998 as the primary mon-
etary aggregate. It was unclear at the time 
whether the Swiss planned to target the larg-
er aggregate. However, the SNB later decid-
ed that, in agreement with the European 
Central Bank, M3 would be used as an indica-
tor only. In the future, the Swiss National 
Bank will provide a three-year forecast, not a 
target, at the end of each year, and therefore 
has emphasized its need to adopt a long-term 
stance. ("Monetary Policy Decisions ... ," p. 1) 
Finally, of less significance to the issue of 
ECB conformity, the Swiss National Bank 
slightly adjusted the semantics of its statement 
on price stability. In its monetary policy plans 
for 1999, the Governing Board considered price 
stability to be attained with an annual inflation 
rate of 1-2 percent. ("Monetary Policy Plans ... ," 
p. 1) However, in its proposed policy decisions 
for 2000, the Governing Board stated the same 
price stability consideration as the ECB, "less 
than two percent per annum." ("Monetary 
Policy Decisions ... ," p. 1) Although this 
instance of conformity appears insignificant, 
the decision made by the SNB to relinquish the 
range of 1-2 percent and adopt an upper limit 
only suggests that the Swiss have acknowledged 
the likelihood of a slightly more volatile infla-
tion rate in the years to come. 
Future Prospects: The Interest Rate 
Sling 
Historically, the Swiss have not only sur-
vived but have flourished as a neutral coun-
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try. Aside from maintaining neutrality, which 
serves primarily as a label within the broader 
context of current technological and eco-
nomic globalization, the Swiss have preserved 
command over their primary monetary tool, 
interest rates. A recent decision by the 
Governing Board at the SNB highlights this 
sacred independence. On February 3, 2000, 
the target range for the 3-month LIBOR rate 
for Swiss francs, the most common money 
market rate for Swiss currency, was increased 
by half of a percentage point from 1.25-2.25 
percent to 1. 75-2.75 percent. This decision 
was based upon an alarming trend of a weak 
Swiss franc against the U.S. dollar, which 
threatened price stability. ("Increase in ... ") 
Moreover, this instance attests to the order 
still maintained by the Swiss over their own 
house. In the case of any euro-related appreci-
ation or depreciation of the Swiss franc, the 
SNB has maintained the power to tailor its 
interest rates accordingly. Retaining this right 
is of vital importance because the Swiss 
National Bank has historically supplied the low-
est interest rates throughout all of Europe. If 
Switzerland ever decided to join the European 
Union, its interest rates would be required to 
rise towards the European Monetary Union 
average. (Deo and Gudin, p. 17) 
In summary, after adopting M3 as its pri-
mary monetary aggregate and realizing it is 
too broadly defined for targeting purposes, the 
Swiss National Bank decided to target the 
interest rate level in the money market 
instead of the amount of liquidity, or Ml. 
(Monetary Policy Decisions ... ," p. 3) The SNB 
believes that this new targeting or "steering" 
process provides greater transparency than 
the former practice (or vain endeavor) of 
steering M1, the most liquid of the monetary 
aggregates. At the same time, maneuverabil-
ity is retained, and the central motive behind 
the Swiss anti-eurofication effort reveals itself: 
the Swiss can maintain their sacred neutral-
ity and their low interest rates by conforming 
to, but not officially adopting, the general 
framework and long-term goals of the 
European Central Bank's monetary policy. 
Conclusion 
According to the Bible, when David con-
fronted Goliath, he survived because he relied 
on his intellect as well as on the precise cal-
culation of his sling. As of the turn of the sec-
ond millennium, the Swiss have found them-
selves in the shadows of an equally 
treacherous situation, face to face with a mod-
ern giant called the European Union. 
Although the EU was launched with skepti-
cism, its prospects for success eventually over-
came the uncertainties that had plagued its 
inception while the Swiss, landlocked by EU 
member countries, opted for independence. 
Meanwhile, many speculators forecasted the 
inevitable doom of the Swiss economy if it 
were to remain outside of the Union. These 
forecasts may have proven correct had the 
Swiss not covertly managed to adopt several 
policies of the European Central Bank. 
There are, perhaps, a multitude of other 
Swiss policy decisions concerning ECB con-
formity that have escaped the scope of my 
analysis. Similarly, many economists may 
argue against the notion of ECB long-term 
conformity; but in either case the obvious 
cannot be ignored. Accordingly, Jean-Pierre 
Roth, Vice-Chairman of the Governing Board 
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of the Swiss National Bank, recently com-
mented, "In terms of economic policy, the 
growing international integration means that 
the short-term development of an economy 
can now be steered to an even lesser degree 
than in the past." (Roth) Moreover, in an ear-
lier speech, Roth's supervisor, Hans Meyer, 
Chairman of the Governing Board of the SNB, 
declared that, with regard to international 
cooperation, "the demand made on any indi-
vidual country is therefore first and foremost 
to keep its own house in order." (Meyer, 
"International. .. ," p. 8) Over the last several 
centuries, which have witnessed two World 
Wars, various European wars, countless 
treaties, pacts, agreements, and the founda-
tion of several international organizations, 
each with its own political and economic 
agendas, the Swiss have upheld their own 
house with prestige. Despite the formation of 
the European Union and, for that matter, any 
other convergence of international powers 
that lies ahead, the Swiss flag will forever and 
always import neutrality, even if it necessi-
tates at times overt acts of conformity. 
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